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COMMENTS
THE SUPREME COURT AND PRETRIAL DETENTION OF
JUVENILES: A PRINCIPLED SOLUTION TO A DUE
PROCESS DILEMMA
The detention of juveniles has been characterized as a "stagger-
ing" social problem.' Every year, almost half a million children are
incarcerated in juvenile detention centers, and possibly an additional
100,000 children are locked up in adult jails.2 These high figures may
at first seem to reflect the underlying social reality that adolescent
crime is on the rise: more than half of all serious crimes in the United
States are committed by youths under seventeen.' Yet, over half of all
detained juveniles are held not as delinquents, but while still awaiting
an adjudication of their delinquency petitions.4 Moreover, the majority
of these detained juveniles are released upon the eventual adjudication
of their case and are not subject to further incarceration.
The incarceration of juveniles prior to a full hearing on the merits
of the delinquency petition is authorized by statute in almost all juris-
dictions.' In contrast to the general rule which permits pretrial deten-
1 The Detention and Jailing ofJuveniles: Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Inves-
tigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
4 (1973) (opening statement of Birch Bayh, Subcomm. Chairman) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
t Ferster, Snethen & Courtless, Juvenile Detention: Protection, Prevention or
Punishment?, 38 FORDHAM L. REv. 161, 187 (1969).
3 Kaufman, Protecting the Rights of Minors: On Juvenile Autonomy and the Lim-
its of the Law, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1015, 1016 (1977).
4Nat'l Advisory Comm'n on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Corrections
(1973), reprinted in P. CROMWELL, G. KILUNGER, R. SARiI & H. SOLOMON, IN-
TRODUCTION TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: TEXT AND READINGS 378, 379 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as CROMWELL].
5 For example, of all the juveniles detained before trial in the following areas,
only a small percentage were removed from the community upon adjudica-
tion-Massachusetts: 25.9%; Sangamon County, Illinois: 22%; Trumbull County,
Ohio: 19.5%; Tarrant County, Texas: 9.7%. See Ferster, Snethen & Courtless, supra
note 2, at 189.
s See Comment, A Due Process Dilemma: Pretrial Detention in Juvenile Delin-
quency, 11 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PRoC. 513, 518-25 (1978). It is important to distin-
guish the various stages of juvenile delinquency proceedings. Juveniles are brought to
police stations either upon a parent's request, a citizen's complaint, or, most typically,
by police arrest. At that point, the police make the initial decision whether to release
the child or subject him or her to court action. If the decision is to detain, the child is
sent to probation intake, where either informal resolution occurs or the child is detained
further. If the decision again is to detain, a petition for delinquency is filed and the
child is given a detention hearing before a family court judge. At the hearing the judge
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tion of adult accused criminals only for the purpose of ensuring the
accused's presence at trial,7 accused juveniles in most jurisdictions may
be detained for the additional purposes of protecting the community
and protecting the juvenile.' These expanded criteria for preadjudi-
catory detention of juveniles have traditionally been justified by the no-
tion of parens patriae: the state may exercise its surrogate parental
authority to protect these juveniles who are especially vulnerable to
harm and lacking in mature judgment.9 Courts were to handle the
youth with paternal care not penal authority."0
Some commentators have questioned the premises of detention
within the juvenile justice system, particularly a perceived failure of the
system to deal coherently with the basic issues of individual liberty and
volition."" A more readily demonstrable problem, however, is the fail-
ure of juvenile pretrial detention to further in practice any of the ideal
objectives of the system.12 Rather than "treating" the juvenile, the
"overwhelmingly negative" impact of detention" often destroys "any
possibility of subsequent rehabilitation." 4 The "deplorable condi-
determines whether the child should be released or detained until the adjudicatory
hearing on the merits of the delinquency petition. If subsequently adjudicated delin-
quent, the juvenile may again be released or detained pending the dispositional hearing,
at which the judge determines whether the delinquent should be given probation or
sentenced to a period of incarceration. See infra notes 57-69 and accompanying text.
See generally Creekmore, Brought to Justice? Juveniles, the Courts and the Law, in
CROMWELL, supra note 4, at 270-98. This Comment addresses only the period of in-
carceration between the initial detention hearing and the adjudicatory hearing. This
period is referred to as "pretrial" or "preadjudicatory" detention, although it should be
recognized that technically a juvenile does not have a "trial." The juvenile procedure is
considered an adjudication of delinquent or nondelinquent status, not a criminal trial.
7 See, e.g., Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1163-64 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated as
moot per curiam sub nom. Hunt v. Murphy, 455 U.S. 478 (1982). Only the District of
Columbia permits detention of accused criminal adults for the additional purpose of
preventing harm to the community. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1321 to 23-1322 (1981 &
Supp. 1983). The constitutionality of that statute was upheld in United States v. Ed-
wards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982). See infra text
accompanying notes 121-28.
'For a thorough discussion of the relevant state statutes and the detention criteria
contained therein, see Comment, supra note 6, at 518-25.
9 See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 554-55 (1966); see also Costello & Worthington, Incarcerating Status Offenders:
Attempts to Circumvent the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 16
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 41, 46-47 (1981).
10 See, e.g., Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A.2d 137, 140 (R.I. 1980).
1' See Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1017.
12 Guggenheim, Paternalism, Prevention, and Punishment: Pretrial Detention of
Juveniles, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1064, 1071 (1977) ("Every respected report on pretrial
detention of juveniles has concluded that far too many children are detained, for the
wrong reasons, in deplorable conditions." (footnote omitted)).
IS R. SARRI, UNDER LOCK AND KEY: JUvENILEs IN JAILS AND DETENTION 14
(1974).
14 Hearings, supra note 1, at 4.
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tions,"15 poor quality of facilities, and minimal amount of treatment
afforded incarcerated juveniles led one court to describe juvenile deten-
tion as a singularly "onerous experience." 16 The youth is removed from
family and friends and placed in a setting characterized by abuse, neg-
lect, and stigmatization.17 The stark situation is that "some juveniles in
detention are brutalized, beaten and exposed to vicious sexual
attacks." '
Public interest groups in recent years have launched attacks in
court upon various aspects of juvenile pretrial detention, 9 although di-
rect challenges to the constitutionality of statutes authorizing juvenile
pretrial detention have been rare20 and unsuccessful. 21 In Martin v.
Strasburg,22 however, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
found unconstitutional a section of the New York Family Court Act
which allowed a juvenile awaiting adjudication to be detained if "there
is a serious risk that he may before the return date do an act which if
committed by an adult would constitute a crime."" The court held that
the section violated due process because it was used "principally, not
for preventive purposes, but to impose punishment for unadjudicated
criminal acts."124 The Martin opinion is extremely significant because
thirty-six other jurisdictions have similar juvenile preventive detention
statutes.25 After the Second Circuit handed down its decision in Mar-
tin, at least three suits were filed challenging other preventive detention
statutes.26
The Martin decision is currently on appeal to the Supreme
Court.27 In reviewing this decision, the Court will for the first time
15 See Guggenheim, supra note 12, at 1071.
1" Moss v. Weaver, 525 F.2d 1258, 1260 (5th Cir. 1976).
7 See In re William M., 3 Cal. 3d 16, 31 n.25, 473 P.2d 737, 747 n.25, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 33, 43 n.25 (1970).
18 Hearings, supra note 1, at 4.
19 See infra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
' For an interesting early article on selecting the proper plaintiff for attacking
juvenile pretrial detention statutes and on how states prevent judicial review of the
constitutionality of these statutes, see Kolker, The Test Case and Law Reform in the
Juvenile Justice System, I YALE REv. L. & Soc. AcroN 64 (1970).
21 See, e.g., People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682, 350 N.E.2d 906,
385 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1976).
22 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), prob. juris noted sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 103
S. Ct. 1765 (Apr. 18, 1983) (Nos. 82-1248, 82-1278).
13 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 739(a)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1982). Such statutes are
generally referred to as juvenile "preventive detention" statutes.
24 689 F.2d at 372.
25 See Comment, supra note 6, at 522 n.33.
28 See Colman v. Zimmerman, No. 81-2215 (E.D. Pa.); D.J.R. v. Larson, No. C-
82-0811W (D.C. Utah); John Doe v. John Harrington, No. 252729 (Super. Ct. of
Hartford, Conn.).
S7 Probable jurisdiction has been noted sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 103 S. Ct.
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address questions concerning juvenile preadjudicatory rights. A number
of Supreme Court decisions have dealt with the issue of which constitu-
tional rights enjoyed by adult criminal defendants should attach to de-
linquency petition adjudications.2 In Martin, the Court will have the
opportunity to apply these principles to statutes authorizing preadjudi-
catory preventive detention. It is the contention of this Comment that a
principled reading of these earlier decisions leads inexorably to the con-
clusion that such statutes are violative of due process.
This Comment begins with a brief overview of the established
goals of the juvenile court system and the development of juvenile rights
within that system. It then sets forth in more detail the reasoning of the
court in the Martin decision, and analyzes that decision in light of Su-
preme Court precedents dealing first with the prohibition of punish-
ment before adjudication, and second with juvenile rights in the adjudi-
cative setting. The Comment concludes that preadjudicatory preventive
detention of juveniles is a violation of the due process clause and should
be declar'ed unconstitutional. Such action by the Supreme Court would
not impair the legitimate parens patriae goals of the juvenile court sys-
tem, but would in fact advance those goals.
I. JUVENILE COURTS AND JUVENILE RIGHTS
The constitutional rights of juveniles have developed within the
framework of a separate court system created for the handling of juve-
nile problems. From the establishment of the first American juvenile
court in Illinois in 1899,29 the unique system was heralded as the ful-
fillment of liberal ideals and the goal of saving, rather than simply
punishing, the child.30 Treatment and rehabilitation, the medical model
of response to juvenile delinquency, permeated the philosophy of the
new court;31 it was to be a tribunal where both law and the behavioral
sciences guided the court's decisions.32 The key to achieving these goals
was to be the nonadversarial, informal nature of juvenile court proceed-
ings. Strict rules of evidence and procedure were to be relaxed, and the
fatherly family court judge was to determine each child's individual
1765 (Apr. 18, 1983) (Nos 82-1248, 82-1278).
28 See infra note 38-48 and accompanying text.
29 See generally M. PAULSEN & C. WHITEBREAD, JUVENILE LAW & PROCE-
DURE 1-9 (1974); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104 (1909).
30 Hutchins, Foreword to PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD vii-viii (M. Rosen-
heim ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as PURSUING JUSTICE].
S McCarthy, Pre-adjudicatory Rights in Juvenile Court. An Historical and Con-
stitutional Analysis, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 457, 457-58 (1981).
82 H. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1927), quoted in M.
PAULSEN & C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 29, at 3.
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needs and then prescribe the best remedy. 3
These broad aims of the juvenile justice system are still recognized.
"The basic predicate of the Juvenile Court law is that each juvenile be
treated as an individual."'" Today, adjudication of delinquency is not
deemed conviction of a crime but rather determination of a "status."3'5
Juvenile courts are still considered "surrogate parents who exercise pa-
rental authority, not penal authority."3"
In the particular context of cases determining adjudicatory rights
of juvenile defendants, the Supreme Court has shown sensitivity to the
unique position of juvenile courts. "The Juvenile Court is theoretically
engaged in determining the needs of the child and of society rather than
adjudicating criminal conduct. The objectives are to provide measures
of guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for society,
not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment.13 7
Concurrent with this respect exhibited by the Supreme Court for
the philosophy of the juvenile justice system, has come an acknowledg-
ment by the Court that the concepts of treating juvenile ills through the
use of informal procedures and an emphasis on rehabilitation might not
be providing an adequate remedy in practice. In 1966, in Kent v.
United States,38 the Court voiced its concern:
There is much evidence that some juvenile courts . . . lack
the personnel, facilities and techniques to perform ade-
quately as representatives of the "State in a parens patriae
capacity. . . . There is evidence, in fact, that there may be
grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults
nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated
for children. 9
Kent v. United States was thus the beginning of a line of cases in
which the Supreme Court delineated the constitutional rights that at-
tach to the adjudicative phase40 of juvenile court proceedings. In Kent,
the Court held that a juvenile court hearing which waived jurisdiction
over the juvenile defendant and remitted the case to an adult tribunal
s M. PAULSEN & C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 29, at 2-3.
I In re William M., 3 Cal. 3d 16, 31, 473 P.2d 737, 748, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33, 44
(1970).
35 United States v. Gonzalez-Cervantes, 668 F.2d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1981).
31 Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A.2d 137, 140 (R.I. 1980).
11 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
38 Id.
11 Id. at 555-56 (footnote omitted).
0 See supra note 6.
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"must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treat-
ment."' 41 One year later, in In re Gault,42 the Court stated that an
arrested juvenile must receive proper notification of the charges against
him, 43 that a juvenile has a right to appointed counsel at the hearing on
the delinquency petition,44 and that at the hearing the juvenile enjoys
the privilege against self-incrimination as well as the right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses.4'5 The charges against the juvenile, the
Court said later in In re Winship,"4 must be proven beyond a reason-
able doubt. In Breed v. Jones,47 the Court held that an adjudication of
delinquency followed by prosecution as an adult for the same crime
violates the double jeopardy clause.'8
While the Supreme Court has sketched the framework for juvenile
adjudicatory rights, it has not yet confronted issues concerning juvenile
preadjudicatory rights. Nevertheless, many lower courts have addressed
such issues.4' For example, despite strong support in the literature
50
most courts have denied juveniles awaiting adjudication the right to
bail.5" The courts have split on the issue whether juveniles detained
prior to adjudication are entitled to a probable cause hearing.52 Courts
have also found the predispositional detention of juveniles in facilities
41 Id. at 562.
42 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
43 Id. at 31-34.
44 Id. at 34-42.
45 Id. at 42-57.
46 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
47 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
48 But cf. Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978) (no violation of double jeopardy
when at the adjudicatory hearing the state is permitted to file exceptions to the master's
findings on the delinquency charges); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971)
(plurality opinion) (the Court concluded that a trial by jury is not constitutionally re-
quired in the adjudicative phase of a juvenile court delinquency proceeding).
49 It should be noted, however, that as of 1973, the courts of at least 36 states had
yet to address such significant issues of the preadjudicatory phase as the length of time
a juvenile may be held before a detention or adjudicatory hearing, the permissible stan-
dards for juvenile pretrial detention, or the permissibility of detaining juveniles in the
same facilities as adults. Hearings, supra note 1, at 408-18 (memorandum of the
American Law Division of the Library of Congress).
50 E.g., Wald, Pretrial Detention for Juveniles, in PURSUING JUSTICE, supra note
30, at 122-24; Comment, supra note 6, at 543-47. But see Guggenheim, supra note 12,
at 1081-85.
51 E.g., Pauley v. Gross, 1 Kan. App. 2d 736, 574 P.2d 234, 240 (1977); State v.
Gleason, 404 A.2d 573 (Me. 1979); Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A.2d 137 (R.I. 1980).
But see Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971).
52 The courts mandating a probable cause hearing include Moss v. Weaver, 525
F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1976); Thomas v. Mears, 474 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Ark. 1979). But
see Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A.2d 137 (R.I. 1980) (finding no right to a probable
cause hearing). See generally Hoffman & McCarthy, Juvenile Detention Hearings:
The Case for a Probable Cause Detennination, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 267 (1975).
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for adult offenders impermissible."
Several aspects of the preadjudication detention hearing-at which
a judge determines whether the juvenile may be released to his guardi-
ans or instead must be detained until the full hearing on the delin-
quency petition-have been successfully challenged in the courts. One
court held that the judge's decision to detain must be accompanied by
written, specific findings." Another court held that a blanket rule for
detaining all juveniles accused of a particular crime is unconstitutional
for it prevents consideration of special facts and circumstances. 55 Also,
if the release of the juvenile is essential for the preparation of his or her
defense at adjudication, held one court, then the juvenile must be
released."
Direct attacks upon the constitutionality of statutes authorizing
pretrial detention of juveniles have been largely unsuccessful, however.
The following section discusses two challenges to one such statute.
II. THE Schupf AND Martin DECISIONS
In New York, as in most jurisdictions,5 7 juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings begin with a decision by the police either to release the child
or to detain him for formal proceedings. 58 If the decision is to detain,
the juvenile is sent to probation intake.5 9 The intake process, which
consists of interviews by social workers of the accused, his guardian,
and the complaining witness, frequently results in informal resolution
and dismissal of the charges.6 0 If no such resolution occurs, a petition
for delinquency is filed.61 Within seventy-two hours of the filing of the
petition,62 a nonadversarial hearing is held before a judge to determine
"' See, e.g., Baker v. Hamilton, 345 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Ky. 1972); State ex rel.
R.C.F. v. Wilt, 252 S.E.2d 168 (W. Va. 1979).
" Commonwealth ex rel. Sprowal v. Hendrick, 438 Pa. 435, 265 A.2d 348
(1970).
8 In re William M., 3 Cal. 3d 16, 473 P.2d 737, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970).
Kinney v. Lenon, 425 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1970).
57 For a discussion of the juvenile detention proceedings common to most jurisdic-
tions, see Ferster, Snethen & Courtless, supra note 2, at 174-86.
1s N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 724 (McKinney Supp. 1982). A study of California
police practices revealed that 66% of the juveniles referred to the police were detained,
while in Seattle the police decided to detain 62% of the juveniles referred to them. See
Ferster, Snethen & Courtless, supra note 2, at 176.
51 N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 734 (McKinney Supp. 1982).
60 A study of New York family court procedures revealed that 28% of all delin-
quency cases are resolved informally at probation intake. See Brief for Intervenor-Ap-
pellant at 33, Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982). A nationwide study
found that 43% are released at probation intake, while another survey found 33% are
released. See Ferster, Snethen & Courtless, supra note 2, at 179.
61 N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 731 (McKinney Supp. 1982).
62 Id. at § 739(b).
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whether to further detain the juvenile.6" The judge may order the juve-
nile detained if he or she finds "facts and reasons" for believing deten-
tion is necessary to ensure the juvenile's presence at the delinquency
hearing"' or to prevent the juvenile from committing crimes before ad-
judication. 5 If detention is ordered, the juvenile is entitled to a proba-
ble cause determination within three to six days, 6 and the hearing on
the delinquency petition is expedited.67 If adjudicated delinquent, the
juvenile is further detained until the dispositional hearing, at which the
judge may order release or placement in either a secure or nonsecure
facility.6 8 This decision is based upon the needs of the juvenile as deter-
mined from the original probation intake report and, in many cases, a
diagnostic assessment.6 9
In People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf,'0 the highest court of New
York rejected both an equal protection and a due process challenge to
the section of the New York Family Court Act that permits pretrial
detention of juveniles if there is a strong possibility that the juvenile
will commit a crime before the date of adjudication.7 1 Applying the
strict scrutiny standard of equal protection review, the majority found
the statute constitutional because it served a "compelling" government
interest in protecting both the community and the juvenile.
72
The Schupf court found that the discretion afforded to family
court judges by the statute did not violate due process. The New York
Court of Appeals rejected the argument that, because future criminal
behavior can not be scientifically predicted, a decision to detain a juve-
nile must involve unconstitutional elements of speculation if it is based
on a prediction of whether the youth will commit a crime. The court
noted that an element of speculation is "necessarily present in the ad-
ministration of any bail system, in the imposition of alternatively avail-
able sentences, [or] in the administration of a parole system.' '73 Since
speculation in such contexts is not unconstitutional, implied the court,
neither is the speculation permitted by the challenged statute.
68 Id. at § 739. Although this detention hearing is nonadversarial, and hearsay
may be admitted and testimony need not be subject to cross-examination, the juvenile
nevertheless has the right to appointed counsel and the right to remain silent. See id. at
§ 741.
" Id. at § 739(a)(i).
I d. at § 739(a)(ii).
Id. at § 739(b).
67 Id. at § 747.
" Id. at § 753.
69 Id. at § 750.
70 39 N.Y.2d 682, 350 N.E.2d 906, 385 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1976).
71 N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 739(a)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1982).
72 39 N.Y.2d at 689, 350 N.E.2d at 909; 385 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
73 Id. at 690, 350 N.E.2d at 910, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 522.
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Furthermore, the majority in Schupf was not impressed by statis-
tics indicating that most juveniles who are detained before trial in New
York are released upon adjudication."' The court felt that such figures
do not suggest that pretrial detainment violates due process. Instead,
the court reasoned that such statistics reflect the fact that more infor-
mation is available to family court judges at the adjudication of delin-
quency than at the preliminary detention hearing, and that judges at
the detention hearings are simply making a cautious decision to detain
the juvenile, for his own protection and the protection of society, until
more information can be obtained.7 5 Apparently, the majority in Schupf
felt that such a cautious decision to detain was a valid exercise of the
parens patriae authority of the state.
At issue in Martin v. Strasburg78 was the same section of the New
York Family Court Act allowing a juvenile to be detained upon a find-
ing at the detention hearing that "there is a serious risk that he may
before the return date do an act which if committed by an adult would
constitute a crime.)
77
The federal district court declared this section of the statute un-
constitutional. 78 In reaching this decision, Judge Carter considered the
case histories of thirty-four juveniles detained before trial and listened
to testimony from several experts of juvenile court processes, including
a New York City family court judge, a Legal Aid Society attorney with
extensive experience representing juveniles in the New York Family
Court, a professor of criminal justice, and the director of child psychol-
ogy at a Chicago hospital .7 Additionally, in sifting through extensive
statistical evidence, Judge Carter found that in 1979, of all the
juveniles held in pretrial detention on the ground that they might com-
mit a crime before adjudication, over half of them had their petitions
dismissed or were placed on probation."0
74 Id.
76 Id.
76 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), prob. juris noted sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 103
S. Ct. 1765 (Apr. 18, 1983) (Nos. 82-1248, 82-1278).
7 N.Y. FAM. CT. Act § 739(a)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1982). The other basis for
pretrial detention of juveniles in New York, id. at § 739(a)(i), which allows detention if
there is a "substantial probability that he will not appear in court on the return date,"
was not challenged in either People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682, 350
N.E.2d 906, 385 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1976) or Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
71 Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
7 Id. at 694-95.
80 Id. at 705. On appeal, the Second Circuit found that of the 34 juvenile case
histories considered by the district court over two-thirds of those juveniles subject to
pretrial detention were never sentenced to further incarceration. 689 F.2d at 369. These
findings are similar to those in other jurisdictions. See supra note 5 and accompanying
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Judge Carter stated that if the equal protection test of strict scru-
tiny were applied, there could be no "compelling need" for the state to
detain the juveniles before adjudication since so many were ultimately
released either before or after adjudication."1 The judge went on to
state, however, that the Supreme Court has yet to subject juvenile clas-
sifications to strict scrutiny, and thus the appropriate standard of equal
protection review was a rationality test.82 The court found that the stat-
ute here met the constitutional requirements of equal protection under
the "less rigorous yardstick" of rationality.83
The court held that the statute nonetheless violated due process
requirements in three respects. The first ground was that the statute
"gives the judge the license to act arbitrarily and capriciously" in pre-
dicting the likelihood of future criminal conduct."' This conclusion was
buttressed by the family court judge's testimony that detention decisions
are based on the judge's "own personal standards,"8" and by the crimi-
nal justice professor's observation that "no method had yet been devised
which could predict with any acceptable degree of accuracy that a juve-
nile shall commit a crime."88 The second due process violation was the
possibility of pretrial detention before a determination of probable
cause. Since the "burdens of pretrial detention are substantial to impose
on a presumptively innocent man, even when there is probable cause to
believe he has committed a crime," ' the district court found that to
impose such a burden on a juvenile without a finding of probable cause
was "at war with accepted concepts of due process of law.",", Third, the
statute violated due process because it authorized punishment without
an adjudication of guilt.8 The district court found that pretrial detain-
ment of a juvenile constitutes punishment because it stigmatizes the
youth as disreputable, deprives the youth of liberty, and is imposed offi-
cially rather than as "the spontaneous act of an errant official." 90
The district court held that the arbitrariness inherent in a family
court judge's detention decision was the "most pernicious" of the stat-
ute's due process flaws.91 On appeal to the Second Circuit, therefore,
text.
81 Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 705.
82 Id. at 706.
9 Id.
" Id. at 707.
85 Id.
88 Id. at 708.
87 Id. at 715.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 707.
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the parties primarily debated the issue whether, in light of the impossi-
bility of accurately predicting future criminal behavior, the statute was
unconstitutional because it gave unfettered discretion to family court
judges to make detainment decisions.9"
The court of appeals, however, affirmed on narrower grounds, de-
dining to address the "serious constitutional questions" whether deten-
tion before trial, for the purpose of preventing crime and protecting the
community, can ever be permissible.9" The court affirmed on the
grounds that the statute was "utilized principally, not for preventive
purposes, but to impose punishment for unadjudicated criminal acts. '"
Such punishment before adjudication of guilt, held the court, is a viola-
tion of due process.95 The court of appeals held that the penal detention
of youths before trial, on the basis initially of "only . . . a verified
petition and later at best upon a finding of probable cause," violated
due process because punishment can only be imposed after a judicial
determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."'
In a concurrence to the court of appeals decision, Judge Newman
stated that he believed the statute was unconstitutional because it per-
mitted "liberty to be denied, prior to adjudication of guilt, in the exer-
cise of unfettered discretion as to an issue of considerable uhcer-
tainty-likelihood of future criminal behavior.
'97
The following section explores in depth the reasoning of the ma-
jority and urges that a principled reading of precedent dealing with
punishment of adults before adjudication and due process rights of
juveniles in the adjudicatory context requires an affirmance of the Sec-
ond Circuit.
III. PRINCIPLES OF DuE PROCESS AND AFFIRMING THE MARTIN
MAJORITY OPINION
In reviewing the Martin v. Strasburg decision,98 the Supreme
02 See Brief for Intervenor-Appellant at 62-80, and Brief for Petitioners-Appellees
at 48-74. Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief
for Intervenor-Appellant and Brief for Petitioners-Appellees].
93 689 F.2d at 372.
4 Id.
95 Id. at 372-74.
" Id. at 373.
Id. at 375. See also the separate opinion in People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf,
39 N.Y.2d 682, 691-94, 350 N.E.2d 906, 911-13, 385 N.Y.S.2d 518, 522-24 (1976) of
New York Court of Appeals Judge Fuchsberg who would find the statute unconstitu-
tional for substantially the same reasons as Judge Newman.
93 513 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), prob.
juris noted sub non. Schall v. Martin, 103 S. Ct. 1765 (Apr. 18, 1983) (Nos. 82-1248,
82-1278).
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Court will examine the constitutionality of a state statute which autho-
rizes pretrial detention of juveniles, and under which most of the
juveniles so detained either have their delinquency petition dismissed or
are released upon adjudication;99 detention under this statute cannot,
under present conditions, further the legitimate goals of the juvenile
justice system.
Due process is a flexible concept that calls for such protection as
the particular situation demands.1"' The Supreme Court has expressly
reserved questions regarding what due process rights attach to the
preadjudicatory aspects of juvenile proceedings 01 (the particular con-
text in Martin). Within the broader context of the overall juvenile jus-
tice system, however, the Court has noted that the application of due
process requirements should not hamper the unique and positive as-
pects of that system.102 With that caveat in mind, it remains clear that
"neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone."103 In the adjudicatory sphere, the Court has repeatedly stated
that juvenile delinquency proceedings must achieve "fundamental fair-
ness;"'"' they "must measure up to the essentials of due process and
fair treatment."' 0 5
The Court has not yet explicitly defined the terms "due process"
or "fundamental fairness" in its limited analysis of the rights of
juveniles.' 0 6 A careful examination of the principles of due process as
gleaned from cases dealing with punishment of adults before adjudica-
tion and with adjudication of juvenile delinquency, however, reveals
that the only proper resolution of the Martin question is an affirmance
of the holding of the Second Circuit.
A. Punishment Prior to Adjudication of Guilt: Principles from
Adult Cases
In Bell v. Wolfish,'0 the Supreme Court declared that under the
" See Jurisdictional Statement of Respondents-Appellants, Schall v. Martin, Nos.
82-1248, 82-1278 (U.S. Supreme Ct. filed Jan., 1983).
100 E.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1971).
101 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 n.1 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31
n.48 (1967).
102 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971).
103 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
104 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971).
105 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966), cited in In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 359 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967).
100 See Justice Harlan's separate opinion in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 67 (1967),
in which he chided the majority's "failure to provide any discernible standard for the
measurement of due process in relation to juvenile proceedings."
10 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
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fourteenth amendment's prohibition of deprivation of liberty without
due process of law, "a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudi-
cation of guilt." 10 8 Bell involved punishment of adults, but its principles
are equally applicable to juveniles.
While the rights of juveniles are not identical to those of adults,
the Court has "expressly rejected" the distinction between adult crimi-
nal prosecutions and juvenile delinquency proceedings as a basis for
holding the due process clause inapplicable to the juvenile context.109
While the unique philosophy of the juvenile justice system shapes any
such application of the due process clause, the fourteenth amendment is
not for adults alone. 1 "Good intentions [on the part of the juvenile
system] do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process
safeguards" in situations where the child will be "subjected to the loss
of his liberty." ' As much as the juvenile's right to notification of the
charges against him, 1 or the rule that those charges must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt,13 the right to liberty threatened by punish-
ment prior to adjudication of guilt is clearly an "essential of due pro-
cess"114 and thus the Bell principle is clearly applicable to juveniles.
In defining punishment in the constitutional sense, the Supreme
Court has drawn the important distinction between penal measures and
regulatory ones, 115 the former being imposed properly only after an ad-
judication of guilt. The Bell Court acknowledged the approach of Ken-
nedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,'1 6 in which the Court had described the
traditional tests to determine the punitive nature of a sanction:
"Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a pun-
ishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of sci-
enter, whether its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether
the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether
an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be con-
nected is assignable for it, whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to
108 Id. at 535.
'09 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50-51
(1967).
110 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
1 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366 (1970).
"- In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-34 (1967).
11 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 358 (1970).
114 Id. at 359.
11 Bell, 441 U.S. at 537.
116 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
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the inquiry, and may often point in differing directions."""
The Mendoza-Martinez tests are appropriate for use in the special
context of pretrial juvenile detention challenged in Martin. While the
Supreme Court has yet to address questions regarding juvenile
preadjudicatory rights, the liberty interests involved in pretrial deten-
tion are the same as those at stake in the later adjudicatory hearing: the
possibility of stigmatization and confinement.11 The Court has con-
cluded, as .well, that incarceration of the juvenile entails the same loss
of liberty and stigmatization experienced by an imprisoned adult.1 "
The specifics of the pretrial juvenile context do not obviate the need for
the protection of due process. Those specific factors do, of course, shape
an application of the Mendoza-Martinez tests to the statute at issue in
Martin.
Detention, at any stage in the criminal process, does not necessa-
rily constitute punishment. 20 In United States v. Edwards,1 2' for ex-
ample, the Mendoza-Martinez test, as applied to the District of Colum-
bia's adult preventive detention statute,12 2 showed that pretrial
detention can be regulatory rather than penal. The law was valid under
the due process clause because it operated only under "closely circum-
scribed" conditions.
1 2 3
The court noted that, under the District of Columbia statute, a
judicial officer must find with substantial probability124 that a detainee,
whose dangerousness has been established,125 has committed one of sev-
eral enumerated violent or dangerous crimes126 before detainment prior
to trial can be ordered. The court reasoned that such a narrowly drawn
statute was not utilized for retribution or deterrence, but was intended
to protect the community, and thus served an "alternative purpose"
which satisfied the Mendoza-Martinez test.'2 7 "[Piretrial detention to
prevent repetition of dangerous acts under § 23-1322 (a)(1) by incapac-
itating the detainee seeks to curtail reasonably predictable conduct, not
to punish for prior acts."1 28
117 Bell, 441 U.S. at 537-38 (quoting from Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. at 168-69).
118 See Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 715-17.
119 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970).
120 Bell, 441 U.S. at 537.
121 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
122 D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322 (1973).
123 Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1333.
124 Id. at 1339.
125 Id. at 1332.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1332-33.
128 Id. at 1332.
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In contrast, the juvenile detention statute at issue in Martin is pu-
nitive. Whether detention, clearly an affirmative restraint, has been
considered as a punishment historically depends in part on the purposes
of that detention.129 Nearly all aspects of the handling of juveniles in
the justice system have been viewed as distinguishable from the treat-
ment accorded adults; the philosophy of the juvenile system-to reha-
bilitate rather than to punish-has been universally acknowledged.130
At the same time, however, the Supreme Court has admitted that a lack
of personnel, facilities, and techniques to allow the state to perform.
adequately in a parens patriae capacity has meant that juvenile detain-
ees have not received the regenerative treatment theorized for chil-
dren." ' The testimony in Martin of a family court judge who imple-
ments the New York law graphically suggests just how drastically
theory eludes reality: it appears that after eventually being adjudicated
delinquent, many juveniles are not sentenced to further incarceration
because the pretrial detention period is "considered sufficient punish-
ment by the Family Court." ' The New York statute thus operates to
promote the traditional retributive aim of punishment.
The Mendoza-Martinez laundry list also calls for an examination
of whether an alternative, nonpunitive purpose may be assigned to the
statutory sanction, and whether the sanction appears excessive in rela-
tion to the alternative purpose.133 Pretrial detention of juveniles has
been justified, in part, as a measure to protect the community. Deten-
tion may be imposed under the New York law, however, on a juvenile
who has not been accused of violent or dangerous behavior,' and has
129 Id. at 1332; cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
1" See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. Although rehabilitationism as a
philosophy for use of the adult criminal sanction has lost most of its former influence,
see F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND
SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981), rehabilitationism is often considered, along with retribution
and deterrence, to be a historical purpose of punishment. E.g., Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 686-87 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S.
437, 458 (1965). The rehabilitative philosophy of the juvenile justice system, of course,
is thought to distinguish that system from the adult system. Yet rehabilitative treatment
implies that the child is in some way in need of reforming therapy, and thus detention
even for "beneficial rehabilitative" purposes may reflect some punitive aspects. While
the wisdom of a rehabilitative philosophy should not be questioned in the context of
juveniles already adjudicated delinquent, the detention at issue in Martin takes place
before even a finding of probable cause that the child has committed a delinquent act,
see infra note 136 and accompanying text, and thus does not give fair consideration to
the fundamental principles of due process.
11 See supra text accompanying note 38.
1 Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d at 371. It has been suggested by many commen-
tators that family court judges often order pretrial detention of juveniles in order to
"teach them a lesson." E.g., Ferster, Snethen & Courtless, supra note 2, at 170-71.
188 Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
134 Martin v; Strasberg, 689 F.2d at 368 & n.15.
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no prior record, 3 5 without even a finding of probable cause that the
child has committed a delinquent act."' 8
The Edwards court accepted a "community protection" rationale
for the District of Columbia preventive detention statute because it
sought to curtail reasonably predictable conduct.137 Without having to
accept the Martin lower court's observations concerning the difficulty
of devising a method which can predict with any acceptable degree of
accuracy whether a juvenile will commit a crime, 38 it seems clear that
the statutory scheme's "track record" is poor. Approximately two-thirds
of those detained under the section of the statute at issue are released
before or upon adjudication. 9 Many children, therefore, are incarcer-
ated and subsequently released due to insufficient evidence of delin-
quency." Similarly, for many of those eventually found delinquent,
further detention is deemed unnecessary to protect the community, or is
unnecessary because the child has been "punished sufficiently. 1 41 The
statute goes well beyond curtailing reasonably predictable conduct and,
in fact, is excessive in relation to the purpose of protecting the safety of
the community.
A second alternative purpose assigned to the detention would be
providing for the welfare of the child. Any incapacitation could protect
a child by temporarily preventing further delinquency, but, again, the
fact that the vast majority of those detained under the statute at issue
are released before or upon adjudication indicates excessiveness. The
Supreme Court has acknowledged that the child in detention receives
"neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and
regenerative treatment postulated for children.' 4 2 Unless the condi-
tions from which a child is removed are demonstrably atrocious, the
harm likely to be caused by "overwhelmingly negative" impact of de-
tention"1 will far outweigh any minimal benefit which might accrue.
14 4
The Court of Appeals of New York in People ex rel. Wayburn v.
Schupf,1 45 on the other hand, when faced with the statute's gross exces-
siveness, suggested that:
13 Id.
136 Id. at 367 & n.5.
11 Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1332.
13 See supra text accompanying note 86.
239 689 F.2d at 369.
140 Id. at 372-73.
141 Id. at 371; see supra note 132.
142 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1966).
141 See supra note 13.
144 Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d at 370 & n.24; infra note 162 and accompany-
ing text.
.45 39 N.Y.2d 682, 350 N.E.2d 906, 385 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1976).
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It should surprise no one that caution and concern for both
the juvenile and society may indicate the more conservative
decision to detain at the very outset, whereas the later devel-
opment of very much more relevant information may prove
that while a finding of delinquency was warranted, place-
ment would not be indicated.146
Such an argument misses the point. Pretrial detention is an af-
firmative restraint clearly implicating liberty interests. While a concern
for protecting society may suggest a tendency to detain in close cases,
due process requires that a truly nonpunitive societal justification for
detention rest on adequate information that indicates the decision will
curtail reasonably predictable conduct. 4 The statutory scheme forces
decisions that not only are premature, but that in fact are unconstitu-
tional; the development of the requisite "very much more relevant in-
formation" exposes the statute's excessive, distorted better-safe-than-
sorry approach. a48 Furthermore, given the reality that the hypothesized
"treatment" of juveniles during detention simply does not occur, a con-
servative decision based on concern for both the juvenile and society
would be, in fact, to release the child whenever possible, and thus max-
imally safeguard the role of the family i.n protecting and ministering to
juveniles. 49
An application of the fourteenth amendment's prohibition of pun-
ishment prior to adjudication and the Mendoza-Martinez test for expos-
ing punitive measures, thus shows the juvenile pretrial detention as au-
thorized by the New York statute to be unconstitutional. It is true, of
course, that in New York detained juveniles are entitled to a probable
cause hearing within three to six days of the detention hearing. 150 This
procedural safeguard is insufficient to meet the requirements of due
process, however, for two reasons. First, the probable cause hearing
comes too late. Within three to six days of incarceration, irreparable
physical and psychological harm may have already occurred. 5
146 Id. at 690, 350 N.E.2d at 910, 385 N.Y.S. at 522.
147 Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1332.
148 See supra text accompanying notes 139-40.
149 Kaufman, supra note 3, at 1021.
150 N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 739(b) (McKinney Supp. 1982).
J51 juvenile hall attendants have expressed surprise at the speed with which
relatively innocent youngsters succumb to the infectious miasma of "Juvy"
and its practices, attitudes and language .... The [detention] experience
tells the youngster that he is "no good" and that society has rejected him.
So he responds to society's expectation, sees himself as a delinquent, and
acts like one.
Aubry, The Nature, Scope and Significance of Pre-trial Detention ofJuveniles in Cali-
fornia, 1 BLACK L.J. 160, 164 (1971). See also Hearings, supra note 1, at 4 (opening
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Second, "probable cause" is too weak a basis upon which to detain
the juvenile. Since preventive detention under this statutory provision is
a deprivation of liberty which constitutes punishment, it is important
for the Court to acknowledge that the due process requirements per-
taining to this practice are indistinguishable from those full protections
which govern the adjudicatory hearing: punishment may be imposed
only after an adjudication of guilt.
B. Juvenile Cases from the Adjudicatory Context
In discussing how the fourteenth amendment applies to juveniles,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the juvenile delinquency
proceedings must achieve "fundamental fairness. '152 The Court has
cautioned, at the same time, that the application of due process safe-
guards must not impair the unique and beneficial aspects of the juve-
nile court system.153 Applying the principles derived from this juvenile
adjudicatory context requires the New York juvenile pretrial detention
statute to be declared unconstitutional.
1. Fundamental Fairness
Overarching the philosophy of the juvenile justice system is the due
process clause's requirement of fair treatment. The Court has stated
that fundamental fairness and due process for juveniles imply an "em-
phasis on factfinding procedures."' " The accuracy of factfinding at ju-
venile delinquency proceedings would be enhanced by permitting the
pretrial release of juveniles charged with crime. Just as accused adult
criminals are released so they can prepare an adequate defense to the
charges against them,155 so also would accused juveniles benefit from
pretrial freedom. Testifying before the district court in Martin, a Legal
Aid Society attorney stated that juvenile pretrial detention has a drastic
effect upon the preparation of a case.15 The attorney is required to
locate and prepare the witnesses by himself, and consultation with the
accused juvenile must be done at the detention facility. One court of
appeals has held that pretrial release will be ordered when it is neces-
statement of Birch Bayh, Subcomm. Chairman) (relating story of one juvenile who was
raped five times in the sheriff's van when being transported from the courthouse to
detention).
152 E.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971).
153 See infra text accompanying notes 161-73.
154 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971) (holding that trial by
jury is not a "necessary component of accurate factfinding").
155 See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 463 F.2d 830 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
15 Brief for Petitioners-Appellees, supra note 92, at 42.
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sary for the accused juvenile and his attorney to locate and interview
witnesses. 157 Further, one study indicates that effective representation
by and effective consultation with the attorney during the preadjudica-
tive phase is essential to ensure "that the adjudication hearing will con-
cern the facts of the alleged offense.
158
Moreover, studies have shown that those juveniles who were de-
tained before trial and eventually adjudicated delinquent receive har-
sher sentencing than those not subjected to pretrial incarceration.15'
One commentator has suggested that this is because "[c]onfinement
before trial prevents the juvenile from demonstrating a capacity to re-
main in his home setting, and misbehavior during confinement may be
taken as evidence that the youngster should not be allowed to return to
his community."16 Detained juveniles, therefore, are automatically
prejudiced at the dispositional hearing. This consequence of pretrial de-
tention seems to violate the basic notion behind due process and funda-
mental fairness.
2. Preserving Uniqueness
The Supreme Court has stated that the imposition of due process
requirements upon the juvenile justice system must not result in the
sacrifice of the unique and positive features of that system. "[E]very
aspect of fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal attention
that the juvenile court system contemplates" '611 should, according to the
Court, be preserved.
In many respects, this paternalistic approach has failed to yield
positive results in practice. Nowhere is this more apparent than with
the New York pretrial detention procedures at issue in Martin. The
horrors of neglect, abuse, and suicide associated with juvenile detention
are well-catalogued. 62 Instead of receiving the regenerative care needed
for rehabilitation, the juvenile may acquire additional criminal skills.1 6 8
"' Kinney v. Lenon, 425 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1970).
158 See Creekmore, supra note 6, at 287. See also National Center for Youth Law,
Advocating Access to Counsel for Indigent Juveniles During Pretrial Detention, 14
CLEARINGHOUSE Ruv. 32 (1980).
16 One study showed that in all of the cases which resulted in placement by the
court outside the juvenile's home upon adjudication of delinquency, 86.4% involved
juveniles who had been detained prior to adjudication. See VERA INsTrrTE OF JuS-
TICE, PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN THE DisTRiCr OF COLUMBIA, cited in Brief for
Petitioners-Appellees, supra note 92, at 43.
160 Guggenheim, supra note 12, at 1064-65 (footnote omitted).
161 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971).
16 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 1, at 3-5 (opening statement of Birch Bayh,
Subcomm. Chairman).
16" See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 1, at 59-68 (statement of George Holland, a
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The unnecessary imposition of such detention, as occurs under the New
York statute, is patently at odds with any notion of fairness, concern, or
sympathy. Further, the district court in Martin found that the proce-
dures followed at the detention hearing lack any semblance of paternal-
ism. The information before the family court judge consists only of the
delinquency petition, the juvenile's record, and the recommendation of
the probation officer."" The crucial decision whether to detain the ju-
venile is made without any diagnostic or psychological assessment, and
without any complete understanding of the juvenile's needs. The typical
hearing lasts only five to fifteen minutes .1 5 Thus, at least at this stage
of the juvenile court proceedings,1"6 there is no opportunity for the ju-
venile to receive the individual, personal consideration that the system
was designed to provide.
By declaring the New York juvenile preventive detention statute
unconstitutional, then, the Supreme Court will in no way impair any
beneficial aspect of the juvenile justice system. In fact, the Court would
be furthering the special goals of the juvenile court system. In his testi-
mony in Martin, the family court judge stated that a major shortcoming
of the New York juvenile program is the lack of intermediate treatment
facilities.1 67 The judge can only order the juvenile to be placed in such
a facility if there is space available and if the facility agrees to accept
the juvenile. 1 8 The Supreme Court has noted that many of the current
abuses in the juvenile courts "relate to the lack of resources." 6' It has
been shown that the pretrial preventive detention rate of juveniles in
New York is excessive and unnecessary.1 0 Curtailing this abuse would
reduce administrative costs and reduce the demand for these limited
facilities. 17' The money saved through the elimination of unnecessary
formerly detained youth) (stating that during his period of detention he learned about
hustling and for the first time became involved with a gang); see also Clark, Does
Incarceration of Juvenile Offenders Reduce Crime? in CROMWELL, supra note 4, at
401-11.
164 Martin, 513 F. Supp. at 702.
'65 Id.
16 The court of appeals stated that at the dispositional hearing, which occurs
after an adjudication of delinquency, considerably more information concerning the ju-
venile, including a psychological assessment, is available to the family court judge. 689
F.2d at 370.
167 See id. at 371.
168 Id.
169 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 548 (1971).
170 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
171 In fiscal year 1971, it cost $456 million to run the juvenile public detention
and correctional facilities, with an average cost of $6,989 per inmate that year. See
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, CHILDREN IN CUSTODY: A RE-
PORT ON THE JUVENILE DETENTION AND CORRECTIONAL FACILITY CENsus OF
1971, at 17 (1971).
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detention could be used to create additional, necessary services for the
juveniles actually requiring them.17 '2 Reducing the detention population
and increasing services can only serve to effectuate the original parens
patriae goals of the court.
1 7 3
Thus, principles of due process and fundamental fairness as es-
poused in cases dealing with punishment of adults before adjudication
of guilt and with rights of juveniles in the adjudicatory sphere require
the Court to uphold the findings of the court of appeals majority in
Martin. The New York preventive detention statute is utilized to incar-
cerate far too many juveniles since most are ultimately released either
before or after adjudication, and this procedure is constitutionally im-
permissible punishment before adjudication of guilt. Further, affirming
these findings will not impede but instead will advance the parens pa-
triae goals of the juvenile court.
IV. PRINCIPLES OF DUE PROCESS AND THE Martin
CONCURRENCE: UNBRIDLED DISCRETION
It has been shown thus far that adherence to the prohibition of
punishment before adjudication stemming from the due process clause
and the principles established by the Supreme Court for analyzing ju-
venile adjudicatory rights requires the Court to uphold the findings of
the court of appeals majority in Martin v. Strasburg.17 4 Judge New-
man, however, in his concurring opinion, found the juvenile preventive
detention statute unconstitutional on different grounds than did the ma-
jority. He declared the practice impermissible because it gave the fam-
ily court judge "unfettered discretion" to determine the likelihood that
172 For an interesting study on how a community-based program for delinquents
cost the local government only one-third as much as traditional incarceration while
offering many more services, see C. H. BLEW, D. McGILLIS & G. BRYANT, AN Ex-
EMPLARY PROJECT-PROJECT NEW PRIDE-DENVER, COLORADO (1977).
173 A somewhat analogous approach was adopted by a juvenile court judge in
Atlanta, Georgia. Recognizing the limited juvenile facilities available to the court, the
judge set a maximum number for how many juveniles could be treated at those facili-
ties. He then set up a priority system so that the juveniles with the greatest need for
detention would be assured treatment. The judge's order is reprinted in INSTITUTE OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOINT COMMISSION ON
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, INTERIM STATUS: THE RELEASE, CONTROL, AND
DETENTION OF ACCUSED JUVENILE OFFENDERS BETWEEN ARREST AND DISPOSITION
app. A, 117-19 (1980) [hereinafter cited as IJA-ABA STANDARDS]. Within one year of
the judge's order, there was a 57% drop in the total number of child days in the Child
Treatment Center. Id. at 7-8 n.14 (quoting Collins, One Solution to Overcrowded De-
tention Homes, (No.3) 25 Juv. JUST. 45, 49 (1974)).
174 513 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), prob.
juris. noted sub nor. Schall v. Martin, 103 S. Ct. 1765 (Apr. 18, 1983) (Nos. 82-1248,
82-1278).
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the accused might commit a crime before the adjudicatory hearing.17 5
Like the majority,171 Judge Newman did not reach the broader issue
whether pretrial detention on the basis of a prediction of future behav-
ior is ever constitutionally permissible. 17 7 Rather, Judge Newman
found this statutory provision unconstitutional because it did not con-
tain adequate procedural safeguards to reduce the risk of an erroneous
prediction about future criminal activity.1
7 8
It is true that the juvenile court system was originally based upon
the notion of a fatherly family court judge deciding what he thought
best served the needs of the accused child. 17 ' But the Supreme Court's
statement with respect to the "critically important"' 80 juvenile jurisdic-
tion waiver hearing is equally applicable to the detention statute. The
"statute gives the Juvenile Court a substantial degree of discretion...
[but] does not confer upon the Juvenile Court a license for arbitrary
procedure."'' In another context the Court stated that "Juvenile Court
history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however be-
nevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and
procedure." 82 The pretrial detention decision is also "critically impor-
tant"'83 to the juvenile. As Judge Newman correctly pointed out, due
process requirements are not met when this decision can be made with-
out reference to any specific criteria or guidelines.' 8"
The difficulty with Judge Newman's analysis, however, is that he
delineates guidelines which do not completely cure the constitutional
error as he described it. He accurately states that "on the present state
of knowledge concerning prediction of criminal behavior, only the fool-
hardy would deny that even with carefully circumscribed decision-mak-
ing, a significant risk of erroneous prediction remains."' 5 Judge New-
man then goes on, however, to list five problems with the current
statute which if corrected "would reduce the risk of error."'8 6 Specifi-
cally he notes that: 1) "the statute places no limits on the crimes for
which the person subject to detention has been arrested," 2) "the judge
ordering detention is not required to make any evaluation of the degree
175 689 F.2d at 375.
176 Id. at 372.
177 Id. at 376.
178 Id. at 375.
179 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
'80 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966).
181 Id.
188 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967).
183 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966).
18 689 F.2d at 377.
185 Id. at 376.
1M Id. at 377.
[Vol. 132:95
PRETRIAL DETENTION
of likelihood that the person committed the crime of which he is ac-
cused," 3) "the judge is not required to assess the individual's back-
ground," 4) "the statute places no limits on the type of crime that the
judge believes the detained juvenile might commit if released," and 5)
"the statute does not specify any standard of proof by which the judge
must be persuaded of a serious risk of future crime. 1 1 7 The implicit
suggestion, therefore, is that if the New York legislature were to redraft
the statute and include these limitations, the statute would pass consti-
tutional muster.
While incorporating these suggestions into the statute might make
the decision to detain less discretionary, there is no reason to believe
that Judge Newman's safeguards would produce more accurate predic-
tions. The district court, in fact, found, after extensively reviewing the
literature and listening to testimony from a criminal justice professor
and a clinical psychologist, that researchers and clinicians are currently
incapable of predicting the likelihood of future criminal behavior.18
The most egregious aspect of the statute is that it is used to incar-
cerate many juveniles who do not need to be detained. Since there is no
indication that Judge Newman's proposals would effectively reduce
that high detention rate by eliminating unnecessary confinement, it
would be inappropriate for the Supreme Court, in reviewing the Mar-
tin decision, to adopt this approach. The more principled approach for
the Court to take would be simply to declare the statute
unconstitutional.
Such an approach would permit the legislature to reevaluate the
entire process surrounding pretrial detention of juveniles. The legisla-
ture may conclude, for example, that the concept of juvenile preventive
detention is neither practically feasible nor constitutionally permissible,
as some commentators have suggested, 18 9 and choose not to reenact the
statute. New York would then join the ranks of the minority of states
which do not permit juvenile preventive detention.190 In addition, elimi-
nating preventive detention is consistent with the belief of many com-
mentators that diversion from the juvenile court system is the best
method for rehabilitating juvenile delinquents. 91 Further, studies have
187 Id.
188 513 F. Supp. at 707-14.
189 See, e.g., Guggenheim, supra note 12, at 1085-91.
190 See supra text accompanying note 25.
11 See, e.g., NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, ASSESSING THE RELATIONSHIP OF ADULT CRIMINAL CAREERS TO JU-
VENILE CAREERS: A SUMMARY vi (1982); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 79-
81 (1967).
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indicated that incarcerating juveniles is ineffective in reducing the juve-
nile crime rate.
1 9 2
Alternatively, the legislature may wish to enact a statute allowing
preventive detention only in narrow circumstances, such as if the juve-
nile is charged with a crime of violence or is an escapee of an institu-
tion. 93 Enacting a more narrowly drawn statute could result in less
arbitrary decisionmaking, and more help to the juveniles who actually
would benefit from preventive detention. 9 Some studies have indicated
that removing some juveniles from their community is the only effective
way to rehabilitate them.
1 9 5
Regardless of the approach adopted by the legislature, it is clear
that the Supreme Court should merely declare the current preventive
detention statute unconstitutional. This remand to the legislature would
require that body to reassess the state's juvenile detention processes,
and hopefully provide the opportunity for a renewed commitment to
the original parens patriae goals of the juvenile court.
V. CONCLUSION
Pretrial preventive detention of juveniles is authorized by statute
in most jurisdictions. Recent studies indicate that most of these detained
juveniles will not be sentenced to further incarceration after they re-
ceive a full adjudicatory hearing, which has led many commentators to
suggest that preventive detention is unnecessary. In Martin v. Stras-
burg,'98 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit declared New
York's juvenile preventive detention statute unconstitutional because the
court found the statute was used primarily to impose punishment
before a determination of guilt. That decision is currently on appeal to
the Supreme Court.
192 See, e.g., A. F. BREED, PURPOSE OF CORRECTIONS (1978); Clark, supra note
163.
191 Cf IJA-ABA STANDARDS, supra note 173, at 78-79 (where the Commission
delineates guidelines for the authorization of pretrial detention).
11 Some commentators have suggested that diversion from the juvenile court is an
inappropriate way to treat delinquents because it merely results in "benign neglect."
See, e.g., Schwendinger & Schwendinger, Delinquency and Social Reform: A Radical
Perspective, in JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE PROGRESSIVE LEGACY AND CURRENT RE-
FORMS 245-87 (L.T. Empey ed. 1979). Even Professor Guggenheim, who believes juve-
nile preventive detentidn should be abolished, concedes that many juveniles are detained
because their parents are unwilling to take them home. See Guggenheim, supra note
12, at 1072.
195 See, e.g., C.A. MURRAY & L.A. Cox, JR., BEYOND PROBATION-JUvENILE
CORRECTIONS AND THE CHRONIC DELINQUENT (1979).
19l 513 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), prob.
juris. noted sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 103 S. Ct. 1765 (Apr. 18, 1983) (Nos. 82-1248,
82-1278).
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Due process prohibits punishment before an adjudication of guilt.
In several cases involving adults, the Supreme Court has refined and
applied a list of factors to determine whether a sanction is punitive or
merely regulatory. The detention at issue in Martin fails this test.
The juvenile court was established to serve as an informal, nur-
turant forum for the treatment of youthful offenders. In a series of
cases the Supreme Court stated that the important liberty interests at
stake in juvenile proceedings mandate that due process requirements be
infused into the juvenile justice system. These requirements must be
imposed, however, without impairing the special features of that
system.
The unnecessary pretrial detention of juveniles violates the Court's
formulation of due process. Eliminating this practice will not eradicate
any beneficial aspects of the juvenile court, but will instead decrease the
strain on the limited resources available. The Supreme Court, there-
fore, should affirm the Martin decision. Declaring the statute unconsti-
tutional will provide the legislature with an opportunity to develop ju-
venile detention procedures that will both respect the due process
protection of liberty and better advance the parens patriae objectives of
the juvenile court.
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